What is the fundamental difference in the verification challenges posed by the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) compared to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)?

The fundamental difference in verification challenges between the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) stems from the inherent nature of biological agents and their production processes, specifically, the 'dual-use' problem. The CWC benefits from the fact that the production of chemical weapons often involves specialized precursor chemicals and facilities that have limited legitimate, peaceful applications. Verification under the CWC, carried out by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), relies heavily on monitoring the production, storage, and destruction of these chemicals and facilities through on-site inspections and declarations. In contrast, the BWC faces a significant hurdle because biological agents, such as bacteria and viruses, can be produced using equipment and facilities that are also used for legitimate purposes like pharmaceutical research, vaccine production, or food processing. This 'dual-use' nature makes it extremely difficult to distinguish between legitimate activities and the clandestine production of biological weapons. For example, a fermentation tank used to produce antibiotics is virtually indistinguishable from one used to cultivate anthrax. Because of this inherent ambiguity, it is almost impossible to effectively verify compliance with the BWC using traditional arms control methods like on-site inspections without potentially compromising legitimate research and commercial activities, which is a major reason why the BWC lacks a robust verification regime compared to the CWC.