How does the dual-use nature of certain technologies complicate efforts to prevent chemical weapons proliferation?

The dual-use nature of certain technologies complicates efforts to prevent chemical weapons proliferation because many of the same chemicals, equipment, and processes used to produce chemical weapons also have legitimate industrial, agricultural, or medical applications. This makes it difficult to distinguish between facilities and activities intended for peaceful purposes and those intended for the clandestine production of chemical weapons. For example, many chemical weapons precursors, such as thiodiglycol (used to make mustard gas) or dimethyl methylphosphonate (used to make nerve agents), are also used in the production of plastics, pesticides, and pharmaceuticals. Similarly, equipment used in chemical manufacturing, such as reactors, distillation columns, and storage tanks, can be used to produce both legitimate chemicals and chemical weapons agents. This dual-use capability makes it challenging to monitor and verify compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), as it is difficult to determine the true purpose of a facility or chemical production activity based solely on its equipment and inputs. States seeking to develop chemical weapons can exploit this ambiguity by disguising their activities as legitimate commercial or research endeavors, making detection and prevention more difficult.