What are the key limitations of the IAEA safeguards system in preventing nuclear proliferation?

The IAEA safeguards system, while crucial for monitoring declared nuclear facilities and materials, has key limitations in preventing nuclear proliferation. A primary limitation is that the IAEA's authority is limited to verifying that declared nuclear material is not diverted for weapons purposes. It cannot prevent a state from building undeclared facilities or pursuing a parallel, clandestine nuclear weapons program. The Additional Protocol to the NPT expands the IAEA's authority to include broader access to information and sites, but not all states have signed or implemented it. Another limitation is that the IAEA relies on the cooperation of the state being inspected. Inspectors have limited power to compel access to suspect sites or to overcome obstruction. The IAEA's budget and resources are also limited, which can affect the frequency and thoroughness of inspections. Furthermore, the IAEA has no enforcement power. If the IAEA finds evidence of non-compliance, it can only report its findings to the UN Security Council, which then must decide whether to take action. The Security Council's actions can be subject to vetoes by permanent members, limiting its effectiveness. Finally, the IAEA safeguards system is designed to detect diversion of nuclear material, but it cannot prevent a state from withdrawing from the NPT and then using its previously safeguarded facilities to produce nuclear weapons. Therefore, while the IAEA plays a vital role, it is not a foolproof mechanism for preventing nuclear proliferation and must be complemented by other measures, such as diplomacy, sanctions, and intelligence gathering.