What is the most likely route for theft or diversion of nuclear materials?

The most likely route for theft or diversion of nuclear materials is through insider threats, where individuals with authorized access to nuclear facilities or materials exploit their positions for personal gain, ideological reasons, or under coercion. This is because insiders possess the knowledge, access, and opportunity to circumvent security measures and accounting procedures more easily than external actors. Insiders can gradually divert small amounts of material over time, falsify records, or provide access to external actors. They may also be able to disable security systems or provide critical information about facility vulnerabilities. While external attacks on nuclear facilities are a concern, they are generally more difficult to execute due to the presence of physical security measures and the risk of detection. Transportation of nuclear materials is another vulnerable point, but it typically involves enhanced security measures and monitoring. The risk of theft or diversion is particularly high in countries with weak governance, corruption, or political instability. Effective measures to counter insider threats include thorough background checks, ongoing monitoring of personnel, implementation of the 'two-person rule' (requiring two authorized individuals to be present during critical operations), and a strong security culture that encourages employees to report suspicious behavior. Addressing the root causes of corruption and improving governance are also essential for reducing the risk of insider threats.